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NOTES
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PROPOSED REVISIONS

OF THE M'NAGHTEN RULE

Introduction: New York Law and Its Origh
A controversy of long standing in the administration of justice
has been the defense of insanity in criminal law. Re-examination
of the law in this area was recently stimulated in New York State
by a conference held under the auspices of the Department of Mental
Hygiene to consider and make recommendations to the legislature
as to the retention or amendment of the pertinent section of the
Penal Law.1
As the test to determine whether a defendant, alleged to have
been insane, should be held responsible for his criminal act, New
York has statutorily embodied the M'Naghten rule 2 in Section 1120
of the Penal Law, the second paragraph of which reads:
A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic,
or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged

criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as:
1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or
2. Not to know that the act was wrong. 3

This test is generally referred to as the "right-and-wrong rule" 4
although the abbreviation is somewhat inaccurate. The M'Naghten
rule was formulated in the course of an inquiry by the House of
Lords in 1843 directed to the judges of England. 5 M'Naghten had
been acquitted of the murder of the secretary to Sir Robert Peel on
the ground of insanity and the judges were requested to clarify the
law in this area by responding to five theoretical questions. The
"test" has been adapted from the following passage:
I Berman, Is It Time to Revise the McNaughton Rule Relating to the
Defense of Ituanity in Criminal Law?, 29 N.Y.S. BAR BULL. 407 (1957).
2 See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
34 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1120.
GuTr tACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 403

(1952);

Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and
Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955). See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
800-01 (1952).
5M'Naghten's Case, supra note 2, at 202-03, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720.
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. . . [T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.6

Of the cases which preceded M'Naghten in the development of

the rule, Rex v. Arnold,7 Ferrers' Case,8 and Hadfield's Case 9 appear
the most significant, although the general concept of exculpability on
the ground of insanity goes far back in the common and civil law. 10
Knowledge of right and wrong in a general sense was established as
a test at the time Ferrers' Case was decided in 1760.11
The
M'Naghten test, however, specifically calls for knowledge of right
2
and wrong as to the criminalact with which the defendant is charged.'
Controversy over the form and substance of the rule ranges from
the meaning of its key words to the very spelling of M'Naghten. 3
The use of the disjunctive "or," giving the rule its two branches,
means simply that the defendant is excused either in the event that
he did not understand the nature and quality of the act, or in the
event that he did not know that the act was wrong. 4
"Nature" and
"quality" have been deemed synonymous and usually to
mean no
more than physical, sensate quality-not emotional appreciation of
the significance or consequences of the act.' 5
Some courts seem to
hold that knowing the nature and quality of the act merely means
knowing that the act is wrong.' 6 "Wrong" in New York State means
moral wrong," 7 not legal wrong as interpreted in some other

jurisdictions.' 8

6 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843).
7 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724), frequently described as setting forth the
"wild beast test" although the judge's remarks were not intended to be taken
literally. S. GLUECK, MENTAL DIsoDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 139 n.2
(1925); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 495-97 (1947).
8 19 How. St. Tr. 885 (1760).
927 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800), an aberrational case in which defendant's
acquittal on the basis of insane delusion was largely attributable to Erskine's
eloquence. S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 147-48; GUTTMACHER &
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 152 (1952).
10 See People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 331, 110 N.E. 945, 946-47 (1915);
S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 123-25.
11 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 142, 144.
22 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (H.L.
1843).
13 See Pigney v. Pointer's Transp. Services Ltd., (1957) 1 Weekly L.R.
1121, 1122 ed. n. (Assizes); Note, The Real McNaughton, 74 L.Q. REv. 1
(1958).
14 People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609 (1954).
35 See HALT, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 501 (1947).
16 Ibid.
37 People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
's See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S.W. 883 (1922) ; Harrison
v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 164, 69 S.W. 500 (1902); Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826,
2 All E.R. 1 (1952).
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Near-unanimous acceptance was accorded the M'Naghten rule
although it was early subjected to criticism. 19 It is the law in at
least forty-four states and in most of the British Commonwealth 2 0
added the so-called "irresistible
As a modification, fourteen states have
23
22
impulse" test.2 ' In New Hampshire and the District of Columbia
the M'Naghten test has been rejected-by the latter jurisdiction in
1954. New York State accepted the M'Naghten rule in People v.
Kleim 24 in 1845; the legislature codified it in 1881; 25 and the courts

have applied it without modification. M'Naghten received detailed
review in People v. Schinidt,26 where Judge Cardozo noted the harsh
criticism of the rule. More recently, Judge Van Voorhis' lone dissent in People v. Horton 27 decried the focus of the test upon intellectual disorientation.
Treatment of the Rule in the Federal Courts
In the federal jurisdiction, the M'Naghten rule has been supplemented by the "irresistible impulse" test which received Supreme
Court approval in Davis v. United States2 in 1897. The military
jurisdiction
has also adopted this modification. 29 In Leland v.
0
Oregon 3 the Supreme Court recently noted the strides of psychiatry
but pointed out that its progress had ". . not reached a point where
its learning would compel [the Court] . . . to require the states to
eliminate the right and wrong test from their criminal law." 31
The history of M'Naghten was radically altered in Durham v.
United States3 2 by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in 1954. The rule was specifically rejected as the sole criterion of
criminal responsibility and the New Hampshire "product"
33 test (considered infra) ordered applied as a substitute on retrial.

19 See, e.g., 2 SEPHiT, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 153
(1883).
20 See ALI, MODE. PENAL CODE, Appendix A § 4.01, at 161 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955). The four exceptions are Rhode Island (probably adheres to
M'Naghten), Georgia (delusional impulse test), Montana (test unclear) and
New Hampshire (Pike-Durham "product" test, see text infra). Ibid. But see
State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d 1079, 1082 (1955), where the court
indicated adherence to the M'Naghten rule.
21 See ALI, note 20 supra.
22 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
23 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
24 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13 (N.Y. 1845).
2
5 Laws of N.Y. 1881, c. 676, as amended by Laws of N.Y. 1882, c. 384, § 21.
26 216 N.Y. 324, 338-39, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (1915).
27 308 N.Y. 1, 16-23, 123 N.E.2d 609, 616-21 (1954).
28 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
29
M
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 200
30343 U.S. 790 (1952).

(1951).

3

1 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952).

32 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Some indication of future treatment of the M'Naghten rule in
the Supreme Court of the United States may be gleaned from critical
statements by two present Justices. Appearing before the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, Justice Frankfurter did not
"... see why the rules of law should be arrested at the state of psychological knowledge of the time when they were formulated . . . . 34
Justice Douglas opined in an article that ".

.

. the only warrant for

the M'Naghten rule of insanity was tradition." 35
Criticisms of the M'Naghten Rule
What then are the essential criticisms of the M'Naghten rule?
The crux of the complaint that M'Naghten is obsolete is that the rule
fails to recognize the universally accepted principle that the human
mind and personality are integrated as to the cognitive, volitive and
affective capacities, and that these elements may not be compartmented.
M'Naghten, it is claimed, is a product of a rationalist era, acknowledging only the cognitive or intellectual faculty and does not allow for
the incapacity of the will or the influence of the emotions. While an
individual may understand both the nature of his act and its wrongfulness (cognition), he may nevertheless, due to mental illness, be
either unable to will to avoid it (volition), or be so emotionally deranged (affection) as to be irresponsible. 6
To this criticism it may be answered that the rule is founded
upon fundamental concepts of free will and individual responsibility
which are basic to criminal law, 37 and was clearly not the whim of a
particular era. 38

Overemphasis of the influence of the emotions or

of the unconscious mind is regarded as tending toward determinism
and undermining the paramountcy of the intellect.3 9
34

Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953,

REPORT,

Cmd. No.

8932, at 102 (1953).
35 Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and
Psychiatrists,41 IOWA L. REv. 485, 494-95 (1956). The Court's statement in
the Leland case, asserting the right to change the law at some future time,
represents a change from an earlier position. "For this Court to force the
District of Columbia to adopt such a requirement [the New Hampshire rule]
for criminal trials would involve a fundamental change in the common law
theory of responsibility . .

.

. Such a radical departure from common law

concepts is more properly a subject for the exercise of legislative power or at
least for the discretion of the courts of the District." Fisher v. United States,
328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946).
36 See S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 264-66
(1925); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 492-99 (1947); Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 80

(1953)
3

; WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW
GUTThACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW

409-10 (1933).

408 (1952).

38 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC
U.L. REv. 25, 50 (1955); Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of thd
McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
39 Cavanagh, note 38 supra; McDonnell, The Right-Wro,g Test, 21
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Another central objection to the rule is that it narrows the inquiry into mental disorder by its focus upon knowledge and thus
hamstrings psychiatrists in their efforts to assist the court. 40 The
question of "right and wrong," some psychiatrists feel, has no meaning to their field since this is an ethical or metaphysical question and
beyond their scope. 41 The very word "insanity" is a legal one and
meaningless to the psychiatrist. When attempting, then, to analyze
broadly a defendant's mental condition, the psychiatrist is abruptly
restricted.
To the claim that insanity is inadequately, even ridiculously,
defined, it is pointed out that the definition does not purport to be
a medical one but is simply a criterion of responsibility. 42 The de43
termination to be made by the jury is a legal, not medical, one.
Further, on the lexicographic question, the ultimate problem of responsibility is in fact a moral one-hence concepts of right and wrong
are essential. 44 To the contention that the psychiatrist cannot tesJ.B.A.D.C. 389 (1954) ; Report of the Special Committee on the Rights of the
Mentally I1, 70 A.B.A. REP. 338 (1945).
A psychiatrist writes: "The psychiatrist considers logical thinking one of
the more secondary activities of the human organism, certainly exceeded in
power by the emotions." Modlin, The Position of the Psychiatrist in the
Administration of the Criminal Law, 4 KAx. L. REv. 350, 351-52 (1956).
40"The McNaghten rule requires medical witnesses to testify in terms that
to them are artificial and confining. A doctor can offer expert judgment when
he talks of illness, disease, symptoms and the like. When he is forced to adopt
the vocabulary of morality and ethics, he is speaking in what to him is a
foreign language and in an area in which he claims no expertness." Sobeloff,
Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond,
41 A.B.A.J. 793, 877 (1955). "A very large part of the confusion which
almost invariably results in the trial of the criminal defendant alleged to be
insane, lies in the fact that the law insists that the psychiatrist deal with
mental states and conditions which do not exist save as legal conceptions."
Dissent of Ch. J. Biggs in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540,
567 (3d Cir. 1951). See Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness,
22 U. CHi. L. REV. 325, 329 (1955).
41 See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 406; Karpman,

On Reducing Tensions and Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry ant the Law,
48 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 164 (1957); "Many psychiatrists seem to resent a
situation in which they are compelled to speak a language not their own ... "
Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 378, 380 (1952).
42...
[T]he Rules did not profess to define insanity but merely to define
the condition of mind in which a person pleading insanity was to be regarded
as absolved from criminal responsibility for his unlawful acts." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 87
(1953).
43 See Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 956, 993 (1952); cf. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640
(9th Cir. 1957).
44 "In our view the question of responsibility is not primarily a question
of medicine any more than it is a question of law. It is essentially a moral
question, with which the law is intimately concerned and to whose solution
medicine can bring valuable aid, and it is one which is most appropriately
decided by a jury of ordinary men and women, not by medical or legal experts."
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tify in meaningless, popular terms, the rejoinder is that the experts'
polysyllabic patois 45 should be accommodated to the jury.40 A suggested compromise is the trained jury or panel; 47 this meets,
however, the general aversion to blue ribbon juries 48 as well as the
particular difficulty of choosing
49 from among psychiatric schools, or
finding impartial psychiatrists.
A third challenge to M'Naghten is the criticism of the use of
any test or symptom to determine responsibility.5" In medical practice the total condition of the patient, including all symptoms, is
analyzed to determine the etiology and status of his illness. All evidence of his mental condition should similarly be introduced at a
trial, particularly in recognition of the recent scientific use of electroencephalograms, spinal lumbar punctures and other media to study
brain activity. 51
The courts are skeptical of this argument since it, in effect, proposes to abolish a standard by which the jury may measure a defendant's responsibility.5 2 To remove all tests leaves the jury on its
own to evaluate conflicting testimony; admission of any evidence on
mental disorder gives the psychiatric expert carte blanche to introduce

Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932,
at 100 (1953).
S5"In light of the esoteric nomenclature used in the field, and the hypertechnical divergence between various schools of psychiatric thought, as well as
because of the complexity and sheer uncertainty of the area under exploration,
it can readily be imagined what wholesale want of enlightenment would eventuate from purely medical testimony from the witness-psychiatrist.': United
States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 324, 17 C.M.R. 314, 324 (1954), rev'd on
other grounds sub non. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
46 Judge Sobeloff concedes this: "If psychiatry is to provide maximum
guidance and assistance to juries, psychiatric witnesses must learn to avoid
technical jargon which baffles laymen." Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal
Law: From MeNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 879 (1955).
47 Ehrlich, Psychiatry v. McNaughton Formula, 138 N.Y.L.J. No. 84, p. 4,
col. 1 (Oct. 28, 1957), at No. 86, p. 4, col. 3 (Oct. 30, 1957).
48 See, e.g., a New York bill to abolish blue ribbon juries. S. Int. No. 887
(1958).
49 DAVIDSON, FoRENsic PSYcHIATRY 74-75 (1952), noted in Fay, The Practical Role of Psychiatry in the Effective Practice of Law, 29 TEmP. L.Q. 327,
328 (1956).
50 This is the essential premise of the New Hampshire and Durham cases.
See text infra.
51 See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 565 (3d Cir.
1951) (dissenting opinion); Weihofen, Crime, Law, and Psychiatry, 4 KAe.
L. REv. 377, 394-95 (1956). It has been charged that an inconsistency exists
between use of scientific devices by the courts and the non-recognition of the
field of psychiatry. Ehrlich, supra note 47, at No. 87, p. 4, col. 3 (Oct. 31,
1957).
52 "The majority of witnesses, however, were opposed to the suggestion
that the M'Naghten Rules should be abrogated and that the jury should be
left to decide the issue of responsibility without the aid of any legal criterion."
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd No. 8932,
at 97 (1953).
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any theory. 53 Scientific devices are largely useful only for analysis
of physiological disorders-somatopsychic (organic psychoses) rather
than purely psychic.54
Existing Modifications and Substitutes
The modification of the M'Naghten rule which has attained
widest acceptance is the "irresistible impulse" test. 55 It recognizes
impairment of the will, holding defendant not responsible, even though
he knew the nature and quality of his act and its wrongfulness, if he
was unable to resist it due to deprivation of will power. 56 The clarity
act could never be
of the term is open to some doubt: an irresistible
57
resisted; impulse suggests momentary urge.

This test is not a substitute for the M'Naghten rule but rather
an additional exculpatory factor-a third branch to the rule. While
5s
approved in at least fourteen states and the federal jurisdictions,
there is no current trend toward wider adoption since it has been
specifically rejected in several states.59 In New York the statutory
formulation of a test has precluded the use of any supplement.6 0
53 "The critics of the M'Naghten Rules readily admitted the difficulty of
deciding what should be put in their place. The majority considered that it
would be unwise to dispense with any formula and simply leave the jury to
determine on all the evidence whether the accused was insane or irresponsible.
They felt that this would leave too difficult an issue to the jury, who would

ask for further guidance and were entitled to receive it, and it would give

too much latitude to psychiatrists. It was necessary to have some fixed stan-

dard which the jury could apply in face of 'the vagaries of a fluid and evolving
science and which would help the judge in charging the jury." Id. at 106.
54Most severe mental disorders are not organic in origin.
CAVANAGH &
McGoLDRIcK, FUNDAMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 31, 48 (1953); Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J.
See Hall, Responsibility and Law:
CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 164, 166 (1957).
It Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917, 918-19 (1956).
[C]linical analysis consists largely of case history, a reconstruction of
the patient's experiences. The essence of this method is the use of empathy,
the sensitive re-living of the patient's experience. It is widely recognized that
such analysis would be grossly inadequate if the analyst did not attain considerable insight into the patient's scheme of values. This requires a reliving
of his moral conflicts and evaluations, including their appraisal on moral
grounds." Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761,
782 (1956).
55 See Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 956 (1952).
56 Smith v. United States, 36 F2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
57 GurrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 410 (1952).
Judge Biggs poses the problem differently: ". . . [lit would seem that any
impulse which is not resisted is by definition irresistible." United States ex rel.
Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
5
8 ALT, MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix A § 4.01, at 161 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). Additionally, it was approved by the Supreme Court in Davis v. United
States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
59 See Keedy, supra note 55, at 980-82.
60 People v. Silverman, 181 N.Y. 235, 73 N.E. 980 (1905); People v.
Carpenter, 102 N.Y. 238, 6 N.E. 584 (1886).
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The "irresistible impulse" test was accepted in this country in
Ohio in 1834 61 and was later more precisely set forth as exonerating
the defendant where
• . . by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the
power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in
question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed .... 62

An effective argument for the rule was set forth in the case of Parsons
v. State.63 The opinion indicated the two constituent elements of
legal responsibility as capacity of intellectual discrimination and freedom of the will and concluded that the criminal insanity doctrine
ought to include exoneration for impairment of the will caused by
mental disease whereby one commits a crime he could not avoid.
This supplementary test, which would seem to meet the central objection to the M'Naghten rule by its recognition of volitional impairment, has been criticized nevertheless from two aspects. One theory
is that no impulse is truly incapable of being resisted and that the test
represents the abnegation of will power. 64 The other view is that
the test does not go far enough: the use of "impulse" excludes mental
disorder typified by brooding and melancholia which may also impair

the will to an extent where the act is unavoidable. 65 In New York,
an example of this latter situation might be the Horton case. 66
It has been suggested that an expression to cover volitional impairment, one that is both more accurate and useable, is "unresisted
urge." Dr. Cavanagh believes the term "urge" to be medically correct, as well as wide enough to include non-impulsive but nevertheless
insane behavior as above described. 67 For the military jurisdiction
the Manual for Courts-Martialtakes the broad approach in its version
of the "irresistible impulse" gloss to v'Naghten:
A person is not mentally responsible in a criminal sense for an offense unless
he was, at the time, so far free from mental defect, disease, or derangement
as to be able concerning the particular 68act charged both to distinguish right
from wrong and to adhere to the right.

61 State v. Thompson, Wright's Ohio Rep. 617 (1834).
62 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866 (1887).
6381 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
64 Baron Bramwell asked: "Would the prisoner have committed the act
if there had been a policeman at his elbow?" S. GLUFK, MENTAL DISORDER
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 265 n.2 (1925); Royal Commission on Capital Pun-

ishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 103 (1953). This is a test of
"irresistible impulse" in the military jurisdiction. See United States v. Smith,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954), reVzd on other grounds sub norn.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Hall, Responsibility and Law: In
Defense of the McNaghten Rides, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
65 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (dictum);
GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 410-12 (1952).

66 People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609 (1954).

67 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 25, 42-43 (1955).
68 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 200 (1951).
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A revolutionary event in the controversial course of the
M'Naghten rule was the 1954 Durham 9 case where the rule was
rejected as the sole test of criminal responsibility for the District of
Columbia.70 Although the court referred to the "enormous development in knowledge of mental life" the rule it adopted was the eightyyear-old New Hampshire "product" rule:
It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act

was the product of mental disease or mental defect. We use "disease" in the
sense of a condition which is considered capable of either improving or

deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or
mental disease. 7 '

The decision was acclaimed by psychiatrists generally and greeted
profession. However, there were exceptions
skeptically by the legal
72

within both groups.

Since the Durham case represents the only significant judicial
assault upon the M'Naghten rule, it deserves close consideration.
There were several unusual aspects to the case: the crime involved
was not homicide,73 the court reversed on grounds other than the
insanity test (which therefore appeared to be dictum but which it set
down as the law prospectively), and the court utilized non-legal materials extensively. The District Court had convicted Durham of
housebreaking, Judge Holtzoff, applying M'Naghten with "irresistible
impulse," having rejected the insanity defense at trial for failure of
evidence of unsound mind at the time of the crime. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the lower
69 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
70 The M'Naghten rule had been adopted in the District of Columbia in
United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1882), and later supplemented by the "irresistible impulse" test in Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d
548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
7 Durham v. United States, supra note 69, at 874-75.
72 Legal comments ran from "careful and psychologically literate," Kalven,
Insanity and the Crimnal Law-A Critique of Durham v. United States, Introduction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 318 (1955), to ".... a legal principle beclouded
by a central ambiguity, both unexplained and unsupported by its basic
rationale . . . " Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI.
L. REv. 367, 373 (1955), and ". . . the abdication of responsibility for determining the standard of criminal responsibility. . . ." Sauer v. United States,

241 F.2d 640, 647 (9th Cir. 1957). Dissents from a few psychiatrists described

the opinion as "insufficient" and "on shaky ground," Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. RLv. 336, 337 (1955), and, somewhat
more strongly, as "unadulterated nonsense," Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the
Criminal Law, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 183, 190 (1958). See Morris, Criminal
Insanity: The Abyss Between Law and Psychiatry, 12 RECoRD 171 (1957).

3'It has been pointed out that the insanity defense has been heretofore

seized upon primarily by those accused of homicide. GUTrMACHER & WEHOFEN,
PSvCHIATRY AND THE LAW 414 (1952); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an
Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 325, 327 (1955).
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court erred in failing to find some evidence to rebut the usual presumption of sanity. The court then specifically rejected M'Naghten
as the sole test and ordered
the application of the New Hampshire
"product" rule on retrial.7 4
The controversy that subsequently arose highlighted the decision's liberality. Abolition of any legal test of criminal responsibility
is at once the merit of the case, according to adherents, and its most
deplorable aspect, according to critics. Judge Sobeloff praises it for
permitting ".

.

. as broad an inquiry as may be found necessary ac-

cording to the latest accepted scientific criteria." 75 Authorities on
both sides agree that the door is opened wide for psychiatric testimony running to the whole picture of the defendant's mental condition.
The new rule allows evidence on all aspects of mental condition
affecting behavior-impairment of cognition, volition, and affection and
the influence of the subconscious. Testimony will be less restricted;
psychiatrists may utilize concepts which are more meaningful to
them. 76

On the other side, it is claimed that too much power is given to
the psychiatrist by the absence of any test for the jury. The overall
effect is to reduce the judge's role and subject the jury to the experts'
diverse theories. 77 Dr. Guttmacher admits that the New Hampshire
"product" test, now referred to as the Durham rule, has ". . . the
tendency to make the psychiatrist, in large measure, the arbiter." 78
Objection to the increased influence of the psychiatrist ought not be
passed over as merely fear of encroachment upon judicial preroga-

74

See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).

-5 Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham,
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 795 (1955).
76 Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 331,
334 (1955).
77 Professor Wharton's early appraisal of the New Hampshire rule pointed
out that "mental disease . . . in fact is a term so indeterminate and vague,
that to leave the question to the jury with the instruction here criticised is to

leave it to them without any instructions at all." WHARTON & STILLE, 1 MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 178 (5th ed. 1905), as quoted by WEInOlFEN, INSANITY AS
A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 82 (1933). See also United States v. Smith,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 324, 17 C.M.R. 314,, 324 (1954) (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds sub noan. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 345 (1955).
78 Correspondence between Dr. Guttmacher and Professor Wechsler, ALI,
MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix C § 4.01, at 188 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). But
Judge Bazelon who enunciated the Durham rule has subsequently defended
it from the charge of delegating too much authority to the experts.
I...
[W]hether petitioner was suffering from such 'mental disease' or
'mental defect,' . . . would be determined by the trier of the facts, not by the
psychiatric witnesses. The witnesses' role would be to supply to the trier of
the facts the data upon which the determination can be made." Briscoe v.
United States, 248 F.2d 640, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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tive.79 While Durhdm emphasizes the "science" of psychiatry,8 0 the
81 is still
admission that psychiatry is "more of art than of science"
82
conceded by psychiatrists and the psychiatrically oriented.
The abolition of a norm and the increased influence of the expert
witness would seem to lead to greater ad hoc determination of responsibility. 3 The jury would pass on the individual merits;
psychiatry seems to favor this approach since punishment should fit
the criminal, not the crime.8 4 This is adverse, however, to the legal
concept of a standard for all with, traditionally, punishment accorded
to the crime.8 5
A further objection posited to Durham, as a substitute for
M'Naghten, is its elimination of the ethical concept. To the psychiatrist, this is medically sound if he believes that moral right and
wrong are meaningless in the analysis of mental disturbance.8 6 To
critics this represents the elimination of the very basis of criminal
responsibility."
This conflict is no newer than that over the historic
rule itself.
Particular problems are introduced by the terminology of the
Durham rule. Failure to define mental disease and mental defect
increases the problem of drawing the line on responsibility. Realizing
that from the medical viewpoint there are no black and white distinctions in this area, nevertheless, the criminal law demands that some
grouping finally be made.8 This is of little interest to the psychiatrist
,9 See Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 100 A.2d 472 (1953). Few,
however, would voice their skepticism as trenchantly as one commentator:
[T]he medical expert has become a stench in the nostrils of upright
judges." Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony
by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REv. 285, 292-93 (1943).

so Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
81 Sullivan, Psychiatry, 12 ExcYc. Soc. Sci. 578, 580 (1933).
82 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision,

5
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U.L. REv. 25, 26 (1955); Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground
for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. Rav. 485, 494 (1956). See Men-

ninger, "Psychiatry and The Law"--A Dual Review, 38 IowA L. REv. 687, 701
(1953).
83 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPoRT, Cmd. No.
8932, at 114-15 (1953).
84 See Karpman, Ott Reducing Tensions and Bridging Gaps Between Psy-

chiatry and the Law, 48 J. Caum. L., C. & P.S. 164 (1957); Waelder, Psychiatry
and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1952).
5 "'Equal protection of the laws' in turn includes the right to be tried and
punished in the same manner as others accused of crime are tried and
punished. . .

."

Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951); cf. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 97 (1953).
86 See, e.g., Karpman, supra note 84, at 164.

87 Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42

A.B.A.J. 917-18 (1956).
88". ... [T]o the psychiatrist mental cases are a series of imperceptible
gradations from the mild psychopath to the extreme psychotic, whereas criminal
law allows for no gradations. It requires a final decisive moral judgment
of the culpability of the accused." Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665,
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whose concern is treatment.8 9 Psychiatrists will agree on only certain categorizations-e.g., psychotics will usually be criminally irresponsible, neurotics not so.90 Between the extremes lies the large
shadow area of the social psychopath; the problem would be how to
apply the Durham rule here. 91 Following the integration of personality theory, all behavior of the mentally disturbed seems influenced
to some degree by their mental condition. If the burden is to be on
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the criminal
act was not the product of the mental disorder, 92 this becomes heavy
indeed when we consider that mental abnormality differs from normality only quantitatively, not qualitatively. 93 In short, since the
gradation is but a continuum from the merely eccentric to the psychotic, the Durham rule encourages use of the insanity defense. 9 '
The possibility of abuse is enhanced by the view of many psychiatrists that criminal behavior is evidence per se of mental abnormality. 95
However, response to the Durham rule in the courts has been
limited. In Andersen v. United States,96 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a counterfeiting conviction
where the District Court had refused to charge the Durham rule to
the jury, and cited the Supreme Court's approval of the M'Naghten
rule with the "irresistible impulse" modification.
The court refused to ". . . join the courts of New Hampshire and the District
of Columbia in their 'magnificent isolation' of rebellion against

667 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (dictum) ; Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 325, 328 (1955).
89 B. Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic Psychiatry, 45 J. CRIm. L.,
C. & P.S. 123 (1954); Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and Bridging Gaps
Between Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 164 (1957);
Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA.
L. REv.
378 (1952).
90
The Royal Commission found insanity regarded medically to mean that
"the patient is suffering from a major mental disease (usually a psychosis)."
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932,
at 73 (1953).
91 "The so-called 'borderline cases,' the psychopaths and the severe character neurotics, will still prove to be the difficult cases under the new rule."
Guttmacher, supra note 88, at 328.
92 See Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 421 (1952).
93 CAVANAGH & McGOLDRICK, FUNDAMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 21-23

94 A judge in the District of Columbia warned:

(1953).

"The defense of insanity
is going to be used by every other defendant who comes into this court."
Schweinhaut, J., Washington Evening Star, Nov. 10, 1954, as quoted in Comment, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 63, 84 (1955).
95 See Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J. CIum. L., C. & P.S. 164, 168 (1957); Roche,
Criminality and Mental llness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L.
REv. 320 (1955).
916237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956).
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M'Naghten. . .. ," 97 In Sauer v. United States, 98 where the insanity instruction was the only ground of appeal, the same circuit
extensively considered and reaffirmed its rejection of Durham. The
Court of Military Appeals, in United States v. Smith,0 9 indicated it
would be hesitant to adopt the Durham approach for the military
establishment. In Howard v. United States,"00 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not have the insanity test
squarely before it. It noted, however, the Supreme Court's approval of the M'Naghten test and the Durham court's ". . . considerable degree of autonomy with respect to law enforcement in the
District." 101 In the state courts, the Durham rule has thus far attracted little support. Maryland 102 and Montana 103 considered it
and adhered to M'Naghten; Indiana 104 criticized Durham'svagueness
on causality; in California, 10 5 where a statute is involved, the court
directed proposals for change to the legislature.
Proposed Substitutions for the M'Naghten Rule
The American Law Institute Model Penal Code proposes a test
for criminal responsibility which strives for a middle ground between
the M'Naghten and the Durham rules:
I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality
mani06
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.'

In attempting to take into account impairment of volitional capacity,
the proposal rejects the "irresistible impulse" test on the usual criticism that it is ".

.

. inept in so far as it may be impliedly restricted

to sudden, spontaneous acts as distinguished from insane propulsions
that are accompanied by brooding or reflection." 107 The comments
of the ALI accompanying the proposal conclude, however, that
97 Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118, 127 (9th Cir. 1956). "Rather
than stumble along with Pike, we prefer to trudge along the now well-traveled
pike blazed more than a century ago by M'Naghten." Ibid.
98241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
95 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954), rev'd on other grounds sub
nont. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
100232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956).

Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956).
Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955).
103 State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d 1079 (1955).
104 Flowers v. State, 139 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. 1956).
105 People v. Ryan, 140 Cal. App. 2d 412, 295 P.2d 496 (1956).
206 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
107 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments 157 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
101

102
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".... attacks on the M'Naghten rule as an inept definition of insanity
or as an arbitrary definition in terms of special symptoms are entirely misconceived." 108 This is directed at the Durham position
which found M'Naghten both an attempt to define insanity and an
incorrect definition in terms of a symptom. The ALI draft apparently accepts the M'Naghten rule as at least setting forth "minimal
elements of rationality" 109 in the absence of which punishment would
be unjust. It extends recognition to impairment of volition in the
broad sense (i.e., not limited to irresistible impulse).
A weakness of the proposal is that it seems to introduce the
Durham rule's causality problem by its use of the term "result." A
further difficulty, considered by the ALl reporter, flows from the
nebulosity of "substantial impairment." 110 Between some impairment
of cognition and volition and impairment sufficient to exculpate from
responsibility a line must finally be drawn. In an effort to meet this
problem, the alternative proposal of the ALT submits the general issue
of justice to the jury:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect his capacity either to appreciate the
of
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held responsible. 111

This alternative test may be compared to the majority recommendation of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in this area.
A Royal Commission, created in England in 1949 to study the
capital punishment question, extensively considered the M'Naghten
rule. 112 Appropriately enough, the criminal responsibility aspect of
its report, completed in 1953 and covering several related areas,
brought forth its only dissents. The Commission's study assumes
significance, not only because of its intrinsic merit, but also because
of its influence upon the Durham case decided in the following year.
The eleven-member Commission, with one dissent, agreed that
the M'Naghten test of responsibility ought to be changed. Of the
ten favoring a change, abrogation was favored by a majority, an
extension of the rule favored by a minority. 11 3 The majority felt it
should be left to the jury ".

.

. to determine whether at the time of

the act the accused was suffering from disease of the mind (or mental
deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible." 114 This proposal is similar to alternative (1) of the American
108

Id. at 156.

109 Ibid.

See Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From
110 Id. at 158-59.
McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 878 (1955).
111 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, alternative formulation (a) (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).

Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953,
113 Id. at 116.
114 Ibid.
112

8932 (1953).

REPORT,

Cmd. No.
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Law Institute as set forth supra. The three-member minority of the
Commission preferred to amend the rule by the addition of a third
branch covering volitional impairment along these lines:
The jury must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused,
as a result of disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) (a) did not know
was wrong or
the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it115
(c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.
The majority recommendation was criticized by the minority primarily for failure of evidence from the Commission witnesses in its
support." 6 As a result it was felt that so crucial an issue needed
"... weighty arguments ... to justify the adoption of a course which
has found so few advocates among those who give evidence to the
Commission." 117 The minority found the arguments for abrogation
insufficient:
From the difficulties of the matter we cannot infer that the law should be
allowed to shirk its duty by requiring the jury to come to a decision without
the guidance of a general principle or criterion.... The fact that the criterion
complete scientific precision is not a
of responsibility cannot be defined with 118
sufficient reason for not defining it at all.
The majority felt that the extension of the rule proposed by the
minority would be inadequate in practice and focused its criticism on
the difficulty of interpreting the words "incapable of preventing
himself." A liberal interpretation of this phrase was held necessary: * .meaning not merely that the accused was incapable of preventing himself
if he had tried to do so, but that he was incapable of wishing or of trying
to prevent himself, or incapable of realising or attending to considerations which
prevented him if he had been capable of realising or attending to
might have
them."19
A narrow approach, the majority feared, of the third branch recommendation of the minority, would not serve the purpose of the rule.
As to the objection raised to the elimination altogether of a test for
the jury of criminal responsibility, the majority view was that some
critics made ". . . too low an estimate of the capacity and'common
sense of juries .... ,,20
As another possible modification of the M'Naghten rule, it has
been suggested by a vigorous supporter of the test that its current

terminology be retained but a wider interpretation given to the term
at 116, 111.
2151d.
116
Memorandum of Dissent, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 285 (1953).
117 Id.at 286.
28 Id. at 286-87.
.19 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPoRT, Cmd. No.
8932, at 111 (1953).
220Id at 115.
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"know" to connote "understand" and "realize." 121 This approach
pursues the theory of integration of psychological functions:
. . to know that an act is morally wrong means more than merely conventional or logical recognition of its immorality. It means that the knowledge
is permeated by feeling, that a person has assimilated the knowledge into his
an icy spectator or in mere lip-service, he acknowledges
self and not that, as
1 22
that he "knew," etc.
*

Conclusions

Most authorities, legal and medical, agree that a change in the
M'Naghten rule is warranted. The controversy swirls about the extent and direction of the change and the spectrum of opinion is wide.
At one extreme stand those favoring complete abrogation of the existing rule; this is the approach of New Hampshire, the District of
Columbia, many psychiatrists and the Royal Commission majority.
At the other extreme are adherents of the rule as a tried and adequate test, perhaps conceding a slight modification in interpretation;
this is the approach of some courts and many prosecution officials.
Between lie the modifications, primarily directed at extension of the
rule to cover volitional and emotional impairment while retaining the
concept of right and wrong and the emphasis upon rationality as the
test's principal criterion.
The intensity of the controversy can be understood to some extent in the differences in training, viewpoint and objectives of the
legal and medical professions. The law's societal approach is concerned with order in the community, with establishment of standards
to which all citizens may look-punishment therefore, according to
the crime and as determined by the penal law. The psychiatrist's
approach is individual-oriented--concerned with treatment of the patient in his particular physical or psychic disorder, and not with the
organization of society as a group.'2 The immediate issue, however,
is fundamentally an ethical one and the test is of responsibility, not
of nedical insanity.
The paucity of legal support for the Durham rule and the testimony taken in the United States and England by the Royal Commission 124 evidence preference for retention of the M'Naghten rule.
121 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 781-82

(1956).
122 Hall & Menninger, "Psychiatry and the Lav'-A Dual Review, 38 IoWA
L. REV. 687, 696 (1953).
123

5

Id. at 699; Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision,

CATHOLIC
124 "Both

U.L. REv. 25, 26 (1955).

the psychiatrists and the academic lawyers who gave evidence before us in the United States unanimously criticised the M'Naghten Rules as
The majority of the judges and practising lawyers,
obsolete and inadequate ....
on the other hand, supported the M'Naghten Rules, on the ground that they
were a good practical test and that it was not possible to devise a better one."
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25
This accords with the law's generally conservative approach. 1
Additionally, the courts retain doubts as to the approach of the field
of psychiatry. Not only is divergence noted within the field itself,
but the philosophic attitude of some of its spokesmen is, in its deter-

minism and positivism,

26

repugnant to a legal tradition imbued with

Christian concepts of free will and individual responsibility.
There is, nevertheless, general acceptance of the validity of the
key complaint against the rule in its present form. Recognition
should be made of impairment of the intellect by the emotional and
volitional faculties due to mental disorder. It was in agreement that
this deficiency existed that many states accepted the "irresistible
impulse" doctrine, even in its inadequate scope and difficult application.
Amendment of the rule for this inclusion would be better accomplished by the addition of a third branch rather than by a revamping
of the entire test. A total rewriting is not warranted by the need to
recognize an additional exculpating factor. The test has worked well
-abandonment would be but concession to critics of "outdated concepts of right and wrong."
Recognizing volitional and emotional impairment in addition to
intellectual disturbance has been the direction of nearly all proposed
changes in the M'Naghten rule. This was the view of the Parsons
v. State 127 decision, the objective of the ALI, and the twofold provision of several of the European codes.' 2 8 The difficulty is in formulating the addition. In effect, the Duruam court and the Royal
Commission capitulate to this inherent difficulty and abolish the
standard outright in shifting the problem to psychiatric experts and
jurymen. The ALT proposal, though purportedly striving for a midRoyal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932,
at 106 (1953).
125 "The right and wrong test has withstood the onslaught of critics, not
because it is scientifically perfect, but because the courts regard it as the best
criteria [sic] yet articulated for ascertaining criminal responsibility which comports with the moral feelings- of the community." Sauer v. United States, 241
F.2d 640, 649 (9th Cir. 1957).
126 E.g., "This philosophy is based on the concept of 'free will,' that man is
free to exercise his will for good or evil. While there may be absolute values
of good and evil in a moral sense, it is obvious that legally there cannot be
such absolute evaluations, that good and evil are relative values, and shift With
the changes in social attitudes." B. Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic
Psychiatryv, 45 J. CRIe. L., C. & P.S. 123, 126 (1954). ". . . [D]eterminism
as a framework for the criminal law appears to be scientifically more defensible
than a framework of moral responsibility. . . ." Kaplan, Barriers to the Establishment of a Deterministic Criminal Law, 46 Ky. L.J. 103, 111 (1957).
127 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
128 The Royal Commission, in considering the addition of a third limb to
M'Naghten, was impressed by some of the Continental codes, particularly the
Swiss provision whereby a defendant is exculpated when ". . . incapable of
appreciating the unlawful nature of his act or of acting in accordance with
this appreciation. . . " Swiss PENAL CODE- art. 10, quoted in Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 110, 413
(1953).
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dle course, rewrites the rule, beclouds it by substituting appreciation
of the criminality of conduct for knowledge of the nature of the act
and its wrongfulness, and, thereby, also rejects the New York concept
of "wrong" from a moral viewpoint.
The addition to the existing rule of a third branch to cover volitional impairment is the course recommended by the Royal Commission minority. Substantively, it follows the reasoning of Parsons v.
State,'29 but is broader than "irresistible impulse," and was the test
adopted by New Mexico in State v. White 13 0 in 1954:
Assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his
knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable
13 1
him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty.

Radical solutions to a problem which will always be difficult,
such as the abolition of legal guides to jurors, or the wholesale introduction of treatment in lieu of punishment, will result in chaotic and
ineffectual administration of criminal law. It would seem preferable
to draft an addition along the line advocated which would meet much
of the valid criticism of the current New York statute, and yet retain
the fundamental ethical concepts embodied in the basic rule.

M
LIABILITY AND

MEANING OF "Loss"
TITLE INSURANCE

IN NEW YORK

Introduction
Title insurance is today the predominant method of protecting
title in many metropolitan areas.' Consequently, the nature of a
policy of title insurance is of concern to all attorneys and particularly
to attorneys practicing in the metropolitan areas.2 The purpose of
this article is to discuss the nature of this instrument. The area of
particular emphasis will be the liability placed upon the insurer. This
will lead to a better understanding of the rights and duties arising
out of this particular insurer-insured relationship.
12981

Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).

13058 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
131

Id. at -, 270 P.2d at 730.
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2 Of the title insurance policies written in New York State in 1953, 91.5%
were issued against property in metropolitan New York City.
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